REPORT TO COMMITTEE(S) OF COUNCIL

INTERNAL ROUTING CHECKLIST

 

ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT: City Manager’s Office

DIVISION:  Legal Services

REPORT AUTHOR: David White

PHONE No.  21933

REPORT TITLE: Essential Services

REFERENCE No.       

DOCUMENT FILE NAME/PATH:      

APPLICANT:        

APPLICANT’S ADDRESS:        

WARD:        

CONTROVERSIAL:    Yes    No

 

To Be Presented To

Date of Meeting

Committees  

1.  CSEDC

 Next or      

2.       

 Next or      

3.       

 Next or      

Council

 Next or      

Other Divisions/Branches Consulted

Forwarded To

Financial Services Unit or Financial Planning

 YES  NO

Supply

 YES  NO

Legal

 YES  NO

Others      

 YES  NO

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Elected Official(s) / Ward(s)

     

Public Groups /

Individual(s)

     

Advertising/Notice

 

Regular Advertising Required

 NO   YES Date:      

Municipal Act Notice Required

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For Originating Department’s Use

Approved

Date

1.

Originating Branch Director or Delegate - - Report is acceptable

     

     

2.

Financial Services Unit Manager, Financial Planning or Delegate (if applicable) – Report Recommended to Deputy City Manager

     

     

3.

Supply (if applicable) – Report Recommended to Deputy City Manager

     

     

4.

Other

     

     

5.

Program Manager

     

     

6.

Manager

     

     

7.

Deputy City Manager or Delegate – Report approved to leave Department

     

     

 


 

 

 

8.         ESSENTIAL SERVICES – OC TRANSPO

 

SERVICES ESSENTIELS – OC TRANSPO

 

 

 

COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION

 

That Council receive this report for information.

 

 

RECOMMANDATION DU COMITÉ

 

Que le Conseil municipal prennent connaissance du présent rapport.

 

 

 

DOCUMENTATION

 

1.      City Manager’s report dated 19 February (ACS2008-CMR-LEG-0003).

 

2.      Extract of Draft Minutes.


Report to/Rapport au :

 

Corporate Services and Economic Development Committee

Comité des services organisationnels et du développement économique

 

and Council / et au Conseil

 

19 February 2009 / le 19 février 2009

 

Submitted by/Soumis par : Kent Kirkpatrick,
City Manager/Directeur des services municipaux

 

Contact Person/Personne ressource : M. Ric k O’Connor,
City Clerk and Solicitor/Greffier et Chef du contentieux.

(613) 580-2424 x21215, rick.oconnor@ottawa.ca

 

city wide / À l’Échelle de la ville     

Ref N°: ACS2009-CMR-LEG-0003

 

 

SUBJECT:

ESSENTIAL SERVICES – OC TRANSPO

 

 

OBJET :

SERVICES ESSENTIELS – OC TRANSPO

 

 

REPORT RECOMMENDATION

 

That the Corporate Services and Economic Development Committee and City Council receive this report for information.

 

 

RECOMMANDATION DU RAPPORT

 

Que le Comité des services organisationnels et du développement économique et le Conseil municipal prennent connaissance du présent rapport.

 

 

PURPOSE

 

Following the conclusion of the 52 day strike by the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 279 (the “ATU”), City Council at its meeting on January 30th, 2009, directed staff to investigate and report back on “the options available, legislative or otherwise to have the OC Transpo service declared as an essential service to minimize or avoid future transit disruptions.” The purpose of this report is to outline for Committee and Council the options available, as well as to identify the potential implications associated with such an essential services designation.

 

 


BACKGROUND

 

Generally speaking, the most traditional of the various strike-arbitration models in labour relations is known as the “Unfettered Strike Model”.  Under this model, the parties can strike or lockout as soon as they are legally entitled to do so – once the collective agreement has expired and the parties have been unable to negotiate a renewal agreement.  This is the labour relations model that currently exists between the ATU Local 279 and the City (via OC Transpo) currently have.

 

However, there currently existare two primary models for the designation of “essential services”:  the aptly titled “Essential Services Model” and the “Limited Designation Model”.

 

 (a)       Limited Designation Model (Mutual Agreement)

 

In the case of OC Transpo and other services governed by the Canada Labour Code (the “Code”), this approach to designating a service as “essential” may best be described as a “limited designation model” which operates as a partial restriction on the unfettered strike model.  In the federal sphere, the Code contemplates mutual discussion and negotiation between an employer and a union on the extent of the facilities and services that must be maintained during a strike or lockout necessary to prevent an immediate and serious danger to the safety or health of the public.  Should they fFailing  to reach such an agreement, the Canada Industrial Relations Board (the “Board”) may, at the request of one of the parties or, as was seen recently in the case of OC Transpo, at the instance of the federal Federal Minister of Labour, decide the question. A similar model is in place in Quebec, which has established an Essential Services Commission to stand in the same place as the Board, though at the provincial level.

 

(b)        Essential Services Model (Legislation)

 

This is the model in place in most emergency service sectors, such as police and fire. In Ontario, such services are generally governed by separate legislation, such as the Police Services Act and Fire Protection and Prevention Act, which absolutely prohibit workers from withdrawing their services in support of collective bargaining demands. Inherent in this model is the view that any reduction in the level of such services may endanger public health and safety and thus no strikes or lockouts are tolerated. Given the types of industries regulated at the federal level, this model is largely reserved to provincially-regulated services.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Given the comments above, there exist two means by which OC Transpo could be designated as an essential service:

 

(1)               Mutual agreement between OC Transpo and ATU; or

(2)               Legislation.

 

Each of these options will be discussed below.

 

(1)  Mutual Agreement

 

In order to achieve a designation that would preclude some (but likely not all) future labour disruptions, the City and ATU would need to reach an agreement that all, or at least a significant portion, of the OC Transpo service would be continued even if the parties were unable to settle the terms of an existing collective agreement. An agreement preserving the entire OC Transpo service, which would amount to an outright prohibition on strikes, would necessarily require the parties to submit any collective bargaining dispute to binding arbitration. This kind type of arrangement is currently in place with the City’s largest bargaining agent, CUPE Local 503.

 

A more limited agreement would presumably allow a strike or lockout in respect of some parts of the service, with only the essential portions of the service continued. Such is the arrangement that has been reached with the Sociéetée de Transport de Montréeal (the “STM”).

 

By May 2007, Montreal has had experienced its 15th transit strike in 40 years.  It was through the Province of Quebec’s Essential Services Commission that the STM obtained a limited, essential service designation that requires the continuation of transit service during the peak rush hour, as well as for a brief duration around midnight. The order in the STM’s case was founded on the fact that, given the particular character of Montreal’s road network and the significant traffic congestion caused by the lack of transit service during peak hours, emergency vehicles were significantly impeded in their response to life-threatening incidents.

 

A frank assessment suggests that there is little probability that the City of Ottawa would be able to achieve an essential services designation, whole or partial, through agreement with the ATU. The ATU’s opposition to any limitation on its members’ constitutional right to strike, which is it has asserted emphatically both before the Canada Industrial Relations Board and in various submissions to the Federal Federal Minister of Labour, would appear to preclude a consensual designation. While the City could have recourse to the review and dispute-resolution mechanisms set out in the Code, namely a referral to the Board, recent experience indicates that a result like that reached in Montreal, would be unlikely.

 

As noted above, on December 29th, 2008, the Federal Minister of Labour initiated just such a review by the Canada Industrial Relations Board and asked it to examine the question of whether the City of Ottawa and the ATU had maintained the services necessary to prevent an immediate and serious danger to the safety or health of the public. During the course of the hearings held in this matter in January 2009, the evidence made clear that the loss of transit service had not impacted emergency response times. This was due, in large measure, to the existence of the City’s Transitway as a road network available for use by emergency vehicles. As a result, the factors that supported a limited designation for the City of Montreal did not exist to sustain a similar designation under the Canada Labour Code. Further, while there was a significant volume of anecdotal evidence of personal hardship provided to the Board in response to its request for public submissions, there was no clear evidence that these difficulties rose to the very high level contemplated by the Code, being “an immediate and serious danger to the health or safety or health of the public.”.  As such, the Board ultimately determined that no additional service had to be maintained by the parties.  A copy of the Board’s decision is attached as Document 1.

 

(2) Legislation

 

Against the backdrop set out above, it would appear that the only viable option available to the City is to seek special legislation declaring OC Transpo as an essential service, thereby prohibiting strikes or lockouts. This was the situation that confronted Toronto City Council in 2008, when it embarked on a review of this option following a short strike by the ATU Local 113 in April 2008.  A summary of the Toronto response is likely instructive in this instance.

 

Toronto’s Essential Services’ Example

 

Following a 36- hour ATU strike in April 2008 (which was ended by the enactment of back-to-work legislation), Toronto City Council sought to address the same question posed by Ottawa City Council in its January 30th inquiry. Given the impact of the strike, as well as the possibility of future labour disruptions, Toronto’s Executive Committee asked the City Manager “to provide a report discussing the options and consequences of the City formally requesting that the Province of Ontario designate the TTC as an essential service.”

 

There were two primary motives underlying this consideration:

 

1.      putting an end to costly and disruptive transit strikes; and

2.      ensuring the continuity of service to 1.5 million residents who rely on the service daily.

 

The City Manager’s Report, presented to Toronto City Council and its Executive Committee in the fall of 2008, provided a comprehensive overview of the following:  various collective bargaining dispute resolution methods used in Union-Management negotiations in North America; current federal and provincial legislation regarding collective bargaining and essential services; a comparative cost analysis of freely negotiated collective agreements against those established through arbitration; and the economic, health, traffic and environmental impacts on the City of Toronto of a strike at the Toronto Transit Commission.  Also included was a report by the Toronto Transit Commission recommending against such a designation, which is an attachment to the City Manager’s Report.  Given the comprehensive nature and timeliness of the Toronto Staff Report, it has been attached in its entirely at Document 2.

 

Following consideration of this material, Toronto City Council voted 23-22 to reject the notion of seeking an essential service designation for the TTC.  One factor Uunderlying this decision were the conclusions reached in a report submitted by the C.D. Howe Institute entitled “No Free Ride:  The Cost of Essential Services Designation”, a copy of which is appended to this report at Document 3.  The fundamental conclusion of the C.D. Howe Report is that the overall cost consequences of an essential services designation are too high, considering that such a designation can neither predict nor prohibit a future transit strike.  In fact, when canvassing all sectors, the C.D. Howe Report indicates that essential services designations have resulted in partial strikes that have lasted longer then than would have been the result in an unfettered strike situation, where there is pressure on both parties to resolve the situation matter and ensure a stable employment situation through free collective bargaining.

 


Specifically, the Report provided the following comment:

 

Canadian evidence suggests that declaring a public service essential increases the cost of negotiated wage settlements, fuels wage growth across sectors – and does not guarantee that crucial services will be provided in the event of a strike.

 

Based on the research conducted, the C.D. Howe Report concluded that the effect on the TTC of an essential service declaration would likely be an increase of up to 0.8 percent in the average hourly wage.  In the case of the TTC, this would amount to an increase in the annual labour expenditures of $6 million and, over the term of a three-year contract, of some $23 million dollars. By way of comparison with OC Transpo, the model developed by the C.D. Howe Institute suggests that the yearly increases offered by the City of Ottawa in an effort to resolve the strike, being 3.25%, 3% and 3%, would rise to 3.6%, 3.3% and 3.3%, if awarded through interest arbitration.

 

A second C.D. Howe report entitled, The Side-effects of Essential Services Legislation, which was part of the Institute’s submission to Toronto’s Executive Committee, further concluded that an essential services designation does not provide a safeguard against strike action.  This report identifies that, since 1977, there have been approximately 671 strikes where an essential services designation applied.  In cases where there is an essential services designation, research showed that strikes are approximately 38% longer than in similar locations and sectors where such legislation is not in place.  When applied to the Toronto situation, for example, this would mean that instead of approximately 2.5 days affected by strikes, there would have been 4 days of partial strikes.  The report concludes that this is likely due to the fact that there is less incentive for either the union or the employer to return to the bargaining table in a partial strike situation because the costs – both political and economic – are assumed to be lower.  This report is attached as Document 4.

 

Based on the above, it is apparent that, while an essential services designation may ostensibly serve to limit the possibility or extent of a strike, research suggests that such a designation may actually result in more protracted labour disruptions, though at a lesser scale. In addition, whatever advantage that an essential service designation may bring could be offset by the additional costs that experts have attributed to the interest arbitration model of resolving collective bargaining disputes.

 

Other Issues

 

(a)        Ending Interprovincial Service

 

As a means of preventing a recurrence of the recent strike, it has been suggested that the City of Ottawa could cease the operation of routes running into Gatineau, Quebec, with the effect of removing OC Transpo from federal jurisdiction and the Canada Labour Code, as well. While such a move would end OC Transpo’s status as an interprovincial undertaking and bring it within the ambit of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, it is unclear whether this change would serve any greater purpose in achieving essential service status for the bus operation.

 

At the outset, it should be noted that transit services in Ontario generally operate on an unfettered strike model.  While the Provincial Government was observed to move quickly to legislate Toronto Transit Commission bus drivers back to work after a brief strike in April 2008, bus services generally are not considered essential services in Ontario, unlike police and fire.  In this regard, the preamble of the Toronto Transit Resumption Act, 2008 makes clear that the legislation was intended to be a temporary measure, meant to address the specific case of the 2008 ATU strike.  Therefore, the Provincial Legislature’s actions in passing this Act cannot be taken as evidencing a desire to make all transit services exempt from the possibility of a strike or lockout.  To the contrary, it should be noted that the Provincial Government made no such similar move to legislate striking employees back to work during the 2008 York Region transit strike, nor during the 2006 Durham Region transit strike.  Nor can the TTC example be taken as indicative of a quicker provincial response to labour disruptions, generally, as seen in the recent decision to legislate striking York University faculty back to work only after their strike has lasted some twelve weeks.

 

Furthermore, it is anticipated that the termination of interprovincial bus service could have significant implications in terms of OC Transpo ridership, recognizing the substantial presence of Federal Government offices in Gatineau, as well as a host of other operational issues.  Given these anticipated effects, and in the absence of any clear labour advantage, it does not appear that the termination of interprovincial service would assist in preventing future service disruptions at OC Transpo as a result of a strike or lockout.

 

(b)        Privatization

 

Both during and following the OC Transpo strike, the question of the privatization of Ottawa’s transit service has been identified as a possible means of avoiding future labour disruptions. Recognizing that there may be operational or governance concerns associated with such a course of action, it should be noted that the privatization of transit service would likely offer no guarantee against a future strike or other labour disruption.  The possibility of a strike is inherently tied into the existence of a unionized workforce and is not associated with the nature of the service owner, be it the private or the public sector. In this regard, York Transit, which privatized a portion of its service now operated as Viva Transit, provides a telling example in that the Viva Service was the subject of a strike in 2008 by its workforce, represented by the same ATU local as are TTC operators.

 

As with the earlier discussion on the merits of termination of interprovincial service, changes to the governance structure of OC Transpo would have little or no effect on the unionized status of its workforce.  Therefore, such an option does not serve to eliminate or minimize the likelihood of a future service disruption.

 

 

CONSULTATION

 

The Financial Services Branch and OC Transpo were consulted in the preparation of this report.

 

 

LEGAL/RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS:

 

The consideration of this report by Council does not have any direct Legal/Risk Management concerns.  However, should Council wish to pursue further any of the options described herein, a more detailed legal/risk management as well as operational and financial analysis would be required.

 

 

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

 

There are no financial impacts from this report.  If Council decides to make transit an essential service, based on the the preliminary analysis performed by the C.D. Howe Institute, the future cost of ATU settlements can be anticipated to increase by an average of 0.3% every year.  With compounding over time this can create significant budgetary pressures.

 

 

 

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION

 

Document 1 –      Canada Industrial Relations Board Order (January 28, 2009);

Document 2 –      City Manager’s Report to Toronto City Council and its Executive Committee (September 2008);

Document 3 -      C.D. Howe Institute Report entitled “No Free Ride:  The Cost of Essential Services Designation” (September 2008); and

Document 4 –      C.D. Howe Report entitled, “The Side-Effects of Essential Services Legislation” (October 2008).

 

 

DISPOSITION

 

     

That the Legal Services and Labour Relations staff will implement any decision undertaken by City Council in this matter.

 

 


            ESSENTIAL SERVICES – OC TRANSPO

Services essentiels - OC Transpo

ACS2009-CMR-LEG-0003                                city wide / À l’Échelle de la ville

 

Mr. Jan Lam, resident, stated that the recent transit strike had affected many residents.  People could not attend medical appointments, could not go to school and lost jobs and those who had to drive faced longer travel times because of major conjestion.  He advised that he had to turn down a job offer due to the strike.  He felt these impacts clearly showed the importance of Ottawa public transit system.  He submitted that the City needed to find a way to avoid any future strikes and it needed to foster better relations between staff and management, which was not addressed in the current report.  He referenced the options identified in the report.  He recommended pursuing a mutual agreement as a first choice and if this was unsuccessful, pursuing legislation as a second choice.  He re-iterated his belief that the City needed to do everything possible to prevent future strikes as these had a negative impact on residents and were detrimental to the City’s modal split goals.  He suggested Council had allowed the strike to go on for too long and indicated he would be exercising his rights during the next election.

 

Mr. R. O’Connor, City Solicitor / Clerk, advised that a separate report would be before the Transit Committee with respect to management / staff relations.  He then provided a brief overview of the current report, concluding that designation would not eliminate the possibility of strikes and would end up costing the City more in terms higher compensation costs.

 

Councillor Bloess noted that Committee was only being asked to receive the current report, though he suspected Council would be dealing with the issue once the ATU contract had been arbitrated.  He submitted that when the time came, Council would need to know the costs associated with running the handful of routes into Gatineau.  He noted that the City already had an agreement with the Société des transports de l’Outaouais (STO) and suggested there may be an opportunity to enter into a financial arrangement with them.  However, he re-iterated that Council would need the facts in order to make the proper decision. 

 

Councillor Desroches did not believe the routes into Gatineau could be eliminated.  However, he wondered about the possibility of having two corporations under the umbrella of a Transit Committee.  He referenced what had transpired in terms of the federal government trying to get legislation into the House of Commons, said he was not sure the City had the right fit in terms of its transit governance, and wondered if some hybrid model could be explored.  Mr. O’Connor confirmed that this was possible, as the City looked to the future.

 

Councillor McRae indicated one of the roles of members of Council was to hear feedback from their residents.  She referenced the delegation’s suggestion that Council had allowed the strike to go on for too long and she wondered what he would have recommended to resolve it more quickly. 

 

When Mr. Lam suggested Council could have asked the federal government bring back-to-work legislation sooner, Councillor McRae noted that parliament had been prorogued and when Mr. Lam submitted that the City could have offered the union binding arbitration sooner, the Councillor advised him that Council had done just that. 

 

Councillor Cullen understood the public pressure to avoid all strikes.  However, he referenced the involvement of the Canadian Labour Relations Board in this matter and its finding that public transit did not meet the test of an essential service.  He submitted that to pursue the notion of essential service would mean requesting legislation, and he felt the City was unlikely to be able to make a case to justify being treated differently than other jurisdictions.  Further, he suggested that the City had to tread carefully when dealing with employees’ rights.  He talked about the fact that over 95% of all collective bargaining was settled at the table and he felt the City should be looking for circumstances to engender negotiated settlements, where each side gives and each side gets something.  He remarked that taking away employees’ right to strike happened very rarely in our society and when it did happen, those workers were compensated accordingly, which was more costly to the taxpayers.  He reminded Committee that there would be a post-mortem with respect to the recent strike.  He noted that since World War II, there had been three public transit strikes in Ottawa and he argued this was hardly proof that the system was broken and required taking away employees’ rights. 

 

Committee received a written submission with respect to this item from John McLuckie of Jewitt McLuckie & Associates, legal counsel for the ATU local 279 dated 3 March 2009.  A copy of Mr. McLuckie’s letter is held on file. 

 

That the Corporate Services and Economic Development Committee and Council receive this report for information.

 

                                                                                                            RECEIVED